debases one meant to have it. And just as having a beard denotes a
virile nature, so not having one takes away from virile character.
S. I now see that injustice is only the absence of justice where
justice ought to be.

17. Why the angel that abandons it cannot regain justice

T. When earlier we spoke of an angel that was given only the will
for happiness, we saw that he would not be able to will anything else.
S. Yes.
T. Now, justice having been abandoned and only the prior will for
happiness remaining, can the deserter go back to the will for justice
by himself, something that was not given to him beforehand to do?
S. Much less. Before it was due to a condition of nature that he
could not have it, but now it is by reason of his fault as well.
T. So there is no way in which he could acquire justice when he
does not have it, either before receiving it or after having abandoned
it.
S. He cannot have anything of himself.

18. How the bad angel makes himself bad and the good angel
makes himself good, and that the bad angel owes thanks to
God for the goods he received but abandoned, just as the
good angel does who retained what he had received

T. But is there not some way, at least when he has it, that he can
give himself justice?
S. How could he?
T. We use ‘make’ or ‘do’ in many ways. For we say that we make
something when we make a thing to be and when we could make a
thing not be and do not. In this second sense the angel could give
himself justice, because he could take it away or not take it away. Simi-
larly, one who remains in the truth in which he has been created and
does not, as he could, cause himself not to have it, in a sense gives it
to himself yet receives the whole from God. From him they receive
both the having and the capacity to keep or abandon it. God gives
the latter in order that they may give themselves justice in some
sense. If they could in no way take justice away from themselves,
there would be no sense in which they could give it. He who gives
himself something in this sense, receives from God the capacity to do so.

S. I can see that by not taking it away they are able to give themselves justice, but they give it to themselves in one sense, and take it away in another.

T. Therefore you see that they should thank God for their goodness in either case, and the devil is not any less obligated to God for what is from God alone just because he threw away what God gave him and did not will to accept what God offered him.

S. I see.

T. Therefore the bad angel ought always to thank God for that happiness of which he is deprived just as the good angel for that which he gives himself.

S. Very true.

T. I think that you are aware that God can in no way make someone unjust save in the sense of not making him just when he could. Before receiving justice, in fact, no one is just or unjust and, after having received it, no one becomes unjust unless he willingly abandons justice. Thus just as the good angel is made just because he does not deprive himself of justice when he could, so God makes the bad angel unjust by not giving him justice when he could.

S. That is easily grasped.

19. That the will as such is good and that no thing is evil

T. Let us turn now to a consideration of the will and recall the conclusions to which we have come: namely, that the will for happiness, whatever it wills, is not an evil but a good before receiving justice. From which it follows that, when it abandons the justice received, if it is the same essence that it was before, it is something good insofar as it exists, but insofar as justice is not in the thing that it was in, it is called evil and unjust. For if to will to be like God were evil, the Son of God would not will to be like the Father. Or if to will lesser pleasures were evil, the will of brute animals would be called evil. But neither the will of the Son of God nor the will of the irrational animal is said to be evil because they are not unjust.

From this it follows that no will insofar as it exists is evil but is good because it is the work of God, nor is it evil except insofar as it is unjust. Therefore since only a bad will or what is due to a bad will
is called evil, such as a bad man and a bad action, nothing is clearer than that no thing is evil nor that evil is anything but the absence in the will, or in something because of will, of that justice which has been abandoned.

20. How God is the cause of evil and willing and action, and how they are received from him

S. Your discourse is a concatenation of true, necessary and evident arguments, such that I can refute none of them, but I do see something following that I do not think I should allow and which does not seem avoidable if what you say is true. But if to want to be like God is not nothing nor is it evil but rather something good, this desire can only come from him from whom all that is comes. Therefore if the angel has nothing he has not received, what he has he received from the one who gave it. What could he receive from him that he did not give? So if he has a desire to be like God, he has it because God gave it.

T. But why wonder that, just as God is said to lead into temptation when he does not free from temptation, we admit that he gives a bad will by not impeding it when he could, since the capacity of willing anything depends on him alone?

S. So put, it does not seem impossible.

T. Therefore if there is no giving without a receiving, then just as we are accustomed to call giving both what is willingly conceded and what is permitted by not disapproving, so it is not incongruous that to receive should mean both one taking what is offered and presuming what is illicit.

S. What you say seems to me neither improper nor unusual.

T. So what do we say contrary to truth when we say that when the devil wills what he ought not, this is received by him because God permits it, and that he has not received it because God did not agree with it?

S. There seems nothing in conflict with the truth there.

T. So when the devil turned his will to what he should not, both his will and this turning were something real, and yet he could not have this reality except from God, since he could not will nor move his will if it had not been permitted by God, who causes all substantial and accidental natures to be, both universal and individual.
Insofar as the will and its movement or turning are real they are good and come from God. But insofar as they are deprived of some justice that they ought to have, they are not absolutely bad but bad in a sense, and what is bad in them does not come from the will of God or from God insofar as he moves the will. Evil is injustice, which is only evil and evil is nothing. But the nature in which injustice is found is something evil, because it is something real and differs from injustice which is evil and is nothing. Therefore, what is real is made by God and comes from him; what is nothing, that is evil, is caused by the guilty and comes from him.

S. It is certain that God creates the natures of all things, but who could admit that he causes the actions of a bad will or the depraved movement of the will by which the evil will moves itself?

T. What wonder if we say that God causes the singular actions that come from the bad will, when we allow that he makes the singular substances which come to be unjust by will and bad action.

S. I have nothing to say against it. I cannot in fact deny that every action is a reality nor that whatever is has its being from God. Your argument neither accuses God nor excuses the devil, but rather absolves God and accuses the devil.

21. That the bad angel could not foresee that he would fall

S. But I want to know whether the angel who abandoned justice foreknew this of himself.

T. When you ask if the angel who did not remain in the truth foresaw his fall, clarity must be had as to what prevision you mean. For if you mean a foreseeing that requires knowledge of an object founded in a certain concept, I reply that he cannot have known that which could equally well not have been. That which is capable of non-being cannot be foreseen with absolute certainty. Thus it is clear that he could not have foreseen with certainty his fall since it was not necessary. For let us suppose that in fact he did not fall, do you think he could have foreseen that which would not be?

S. It seems that that which in the future might not be cannot be foreseen, nor can that which is foreseen with certainty not be in the future. But now I recall that famous question concerning the divine foreknowledge and free will. For although it is asserted with such authority and is held with such profit that no human argument can
put in doubt the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will, still, they do seem incompatible to reason when it thinks of them. That is why we find in this matter a tendency to affirm one of the two to the point of obscuring the other and thus run the risk of sinking in the sea of incredulity; others are in danger of falling while they fight against the adverse winds that buffet them. Thus although it is true that the divine foreknowledge embraces all the acts brought about by free will and that none of these acts is determined necessarily, none the less it seems that that which is foreseen by God might not come about.

T. I will answer briefly now: Divine foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge. He who has always present all things does not have foreknowledge of the future, but knowledge of the present. Therefore since foreknowledge of a future event is going to be considered differently than knowledge of a present thing, what is called divine foreknowledge and what is properly foreknowledge do not have the same consequences.

S. I agree.

T. So let us return to the question we have in hand.

S. What you say makes sense, but with the understanding that you do not refuse to tell me what God deigns to manifest to you when I ask you to respond to the problem that I have raised. Its solution is in fact most necessary, if anyone can find it or if it is possible to find it. Indeed I confess that, prescinding from the divine authority to which I defer without hesitation, I have not yet read a satisfying argument that enables me to grasp the solution.

T. When we get to it, if we do, it will be as God gives; now however, by the argument given above it is clear that the apostate angel could not foresee his own ruin by that knowledge which makes what is known necessary. Hear another argument that excludes his foreseeing his own fall not only with secure foreknowledge but even with conjecture or presentiment.

S. I await that argument.

T. If, while still retaining a good will, he knew that he would fall, either he would have willed that it should come about or not.

S. One of the two must be true.

T. But if, along with foreknowledge, he also had the will to fall, he would already have fallen because of this bad will itself.

\(^3\) See Anselm's *De Concordia*.
S. What you say is self-evident.

T. Therefore he did not know that he would be ruined before he fell, by willing his own ruin.

S. I have no objection to that conclusion.

T. But if he knew that he would fall and did not will it, he would be more miserable the more he willed to stand firm.

S. That cannot be denied.

T. And he would be more just the more he wished to stand firm and the more just he was the happier he deserved to be.

S. I cannot deny it.

T. So if he foresaw that he would fall while not willing to fall, he would be more unhappy because of that which should make him happier, which is absurd.

S. I cannot deny this consequence, but I see that it not only comes about without contradiction, but in a laudable way and by the disposition of divine grace. Often indeed—to cite only a couple of examples of the suffering of the just—the more one is virtuous, the more he is saddened, because of compassion, by the disgrace of another, and often he who has the greater constancy in virtue is persecuted with more insistence and cruelty by the unjust.

T. It is not the same with man and angel. Human nature, indeed, because of original sin has become subject to innumerable sufferings, and because of this capacity for suffering divine grace fashions our incorruptibility. But the angel, without any preceding sin, merited the suffering of some evil.

S. You have answered my difficulty. It is clear that this argument not only excludes that the bad angel foresaw with certainty his own fall, but also that he could foresee it with probability.

T. There is another argument that seems to me to demonstrate that he could not in any way foresee his own future prevarication. He would have had to foresee it either as forced or as spontaneous. But he had no reason to suspect that he could be forced and, as long as he willed to persevere in truth, he could not in any way think of abandoning it voluntarily. We already showed earlier in fact that so long as he had right will, he wanted to persevere in this will. And, willing to maintain with perseverance the rectitude he had, I do not see how he could have had even a remote suspicion that, without the intervention of any other cause, he would have abandoned it of his own will. I do not deny that he knew that he could change his will, but I say that he could not think of changing spontaneously, without
some other motive, a will that he intended to maintain with perseverence.

S. He who listens carefully to what you say clearly sees that the bad angel could not in any way know with certainty or even only with probability that he would do the evil that he did.

22. That he knew that he ought not to will what he sinned by willing and that he ought to be punished if he were to sin

S. But I also want you to make me see if he knew that he ought not to will that which by prevaricating he willed.

T. There can be no doubt, if you recall what was said above. If he knew that he ought not to will what unjustly he willed, he would have been ignorant that he ought to retain the will that he abandoned. Wherefore he would neither be just in retaining it, nor unjust in abandoning a justice of which he was unaware. Nor could he not have willed more of that which he had if he had been unaware of having the obligation to be content with which he had received. Finally, since he was rational, and nothing prevented him from using reason, he could not be unaware what he should and what he should not will.

S. I do not see how your argument could be refuted, but it seems to me to give rise to a problem. If indeed he knew that he ought not to abandon what he had received, he knew that he would be punished if he abandoned it. So how could he spontaneously will that which would make him unhappy, he who had received as an inseparable inclination of his will to be happy?

23. That he ought not to know that he would be punished if he sinned

T. Just as it is certain that he could not be ignorant of the fact that he should be punished if he were to sin, so is it that he ought not to have known that having sinned he would be punished.

S. And how could he have ignored this, if he was so rational that his rationality could not be impeded from knowing the truth because it was weighed down as we are with a mortal body?

T. Because he was rational, he could understand that he would justly be punished if he sinned, but since God's judgements are a deep abyss and his ways inaccessible to us [Rom. 11: 33], he was
unable to know whether God would do what he justly could do. But, even if one should say that he could not believe that God would have condemned the creature he had made with so much goodness because of his guilt, he would not in fact express something impossible, especially since no example of justice punishing injustice would have preceded, and the angel was certain that the number that were created to enjoy God had been established with so much wisdom as to have nothing superfluous and to be unable to be lessened without leaving something incomplete, and that God’s wonderful work could not remain partially incomplete. On the other hand, he could in no way know, if man had already been created man, that God would put human nature in place of the angelic and the angelic in the place of the human should he fall. Rather he had to think God would reconstitute every nature in the way it had been made for itself and not for another; much less could he have thought, if man had not yet been created, that God would have created him to take the place of another nature. What is absurd about any of that?

S. That seems to me most probable.
T. Let us return then to what I said, that is, that the bad angel need not know that he would be damned. If indeed he had known it, he would have been unable to will spontaneously that which would render him unhappy while he had and willed felicity. And then he would not have been virtuous in not willing that which he ought not, because he could not do otherwise. And for the same reason consider if he should have known what you ask. For if he should know it, either he would have sinned or not.
S. One or the other.
T. If such punishment had been foreseen he would sin without need and without any contrary force and would be that much more deserving of punishment.
S. Yes.
T. So he could not have enjoyed such foreknowledge.
S. One who truly sinned ought not to have known the punishment.
T. And if he would not have sinned, he would have acted either because of a good will alone or out of fear of punishment.
S. No other hypothesis is admissible.
T. But that he had not avoided sin only out of love of justice, his very act demonstrates.
S. No doubt.
T. But if he avoided it out of fear, he would not have been just.
S. Thus it is clear that there is no way he could have known that an established penalty would have followed his sin.

24. That even the good angel ought not to know this

S. But since we think that the angel who remained in the truth and the one who did not were granted equal knowledge at the moment of their creation, I do not see why this knowledge must be denied to the one that had a good will so tenacious as to be sufficient to avoid sin.
T. Yet the good angel neither could have nor should have contemned the penalty he foresaw.
S. So it seems.
T. Therefore just as the love of justice alone, so the hatred of punishment alone, would have sufficed for not sinning.
S. Nothing is plainer.
T. He would therefore have had two reasons for not sinning, one honourable and useful, the other neither, that is, the love of justice and the hatred of punishment. For it is not honourable not to sin solely out of hatred of punishment, and such a hatred is useless to avoid sinning, where only the love of justice suffices.
S. There is nothing I can say against that.
T. What then? Is not his perseverance much more attractive with a single motive that is worthy and useful, because spontaneous, than if it is joined with another motive unworthy and useless?
S. What you say is so self-evident that, while earlier I wanted him to know, now I am content that he should have been unaware, except that now we cannot deny that he knew, because after the example of the fallen angel, he could not ignore it.

25. That the good angel by this fact alone that he now has knowledge of the fall of the devil is said no longer to be able to sin, though for him this works for glory

T. But if now both the one and the other, the good and bad angel, were certain that such a penalty would follow such a fault, just as the knowledge of one is different from that of the other, so the cause of
their knowledge and its end differ. Indeed, what the one knows by his own experience, the other learns only from the example of the other. The first knows it because he did not persevere, the other in another way because he did persevere.

Wherefore just as the knowledge of the first redounds to his dishonour, because in a blameworthy way he did not persevere, so the knowledge of the other is to his glory, because he persevered in a manner worthy of praise. If then it is said that the second, by the sole fact that he has this knowledge, can then not sin, it is clear that, just as his knowledge acquired with a praiseworthy perseverance turns to his glory, so the impossibility of sinning due to this knowledge turns to his glory. Just as the bad angel is worthy of blame because he cannot return to justice, so the good angel is worthy of praise because he cannot depart from it. As the one cannot now return because he turned away from it solely because of a bad will, so the other can no longer depart from it because he is maintained in justice solely by a good will. Hence it is manifest that, just as the inability to recuperate what has been abandoned is due to the punishment for sin, so the reward of virtue in the other is that he cannot abandon what he has retained.

S. Your meditation on this knowledge and inability of the angel would be attractive if, as you say, this knowledge and this inability to sin were in the good angel as the proper result of his having persevered. But it does not now seem to me that he has acquired them because he has persevered, but because the other has not.

T. If it were as you say, the good angel would be able to rejoice in the fall of the apostate angel, because this fall enabled him to acquire the knowledge that now impedes him from sinning and from being unhappy, not because he merited it, but because the other did not. All of which is absurd.

S. It seems much more absurd that the virtuous angel rejoiced in the fall of the sinning angel, as you showed; so much more is it necessary that you make me see that the first did not acquire the knowledge of which we speak because of the sin of the other.

T. You need not say that the good angel came to this knowledge just because the bad angel sinned, but that the good angel came to it having seen the example of the one who fell because he sinned. If in fact neither had sinned, God would have given this knowledge to both of them, because of their perseverance, in another way, without
the example of the fall. No one will say that God could not have given this knowledge to the angels in another way. When one sinned, God taught the other with the example of the first what he wanted to teach him, not by impotence, as if he could not teach him in another way, but through a greater power, that is by that which draws good even from evil, lest evil be deprived of meaning in the reign of omnipotent wisdom.

S. What you say pleases me very much.

T. It will please you too that the good angel cannot now sin for this reason alone: that he knows the sin of the bad angel to have been followed by punishment, which inability does not deprive him of praise, but is the reward for having served justice. But you know, because it was made clear above, that he cannot sin because, thanks to the merit of his perseverance, he has progressed to the point where he does not see what more he could desire.

S. I have forgotten nothing that you have achieved by your inquiring reason.

26. What horrifies us about the word ‘evil’ and the works that injustice is said to do if both are nothing

S. Although you have responded to all my questions, I still wait for you to explain what horrifies us when we hear the word ‘evil’ and what causes the actions of injustice such as in theft, and lust—if evil is nothing.

T. I will reply briefly. That evil which is vice is always nothing; the evil that is suffering is sometimes without doubt nothing, as with blindness, and sometimes real, like sadness and sorrow, and we always detest the suffering that is something real. When then we hear the word ‘evil’ we do not fear the evil that is nothing, but that which is something real and follows the lack of the good. Many sufferings follow on injustice and blindness and those in fact are nothing, but these sufferings are evil and are something real and it is these we fear when we hear the word ‘evil’.

When we say that injustice causes theft or that blindness causes a man to fall in a ditch, we do not intend to say that injustice and blindness cause something real, but that if justice were in the will and sight in the eye, theft would not come about and one would not fall in the ditch. It is as when we say that the absence of the pilot causes
the ship to go aground, or the absence of a bridle makes the horse run off, which are equivalent to: if the pilot and bridle had been present the wind would not have taken the ship nor the horse run off. For as the ship is governed by the pilot, so is the horse by the bridle; so too a man’s will is governed by justice and his feet by sight.

S. You have satisfied me with respect to the evil that is injustice, such that all that this question raised in my mind has been clarified. The question concerning this evil seems to arise from the fact that, if it were some essence, it would be caused by God, from whom it is necessary that every thing that is comes, and from whom it is impossible that injustice and sin come. But the evil that in some way is something seems to cause difficulties for the true faith.

27. How evil came to an angel when he was good

S. So would you please reply briefly to my fatuous request, so that I can reply to one who asks me. It is not always easy to reply wisely to the questions of the unwise. So I ask you whence comes for the first time that evil which is called injustice or sin in the angel who was created just.

T. Tell me whence comes the non-being in something real.

S. That which is nothing neither comes nor goes.

T. Then why do you ask where the evil that is injustice comes from?

S. Because when justice departs from where it was, we say that injustice has come.

T. Speak more clearly and properly, and ask me about the departure of justice. A well-formed question is easier to answer, whereas the ill-formed one makes it more difficult.

S. Why does justice depart from the just angel?

T. Speaking properly, it does not depart from him, but he abandons it by willing what he ought not.

S. Why does he abandon it?

T. When I say that by willing what he ought not he abandons it, I show openly why and how he abandons it. He abandons it because he wills what he ought not to will, and in this way it is by willing what he ought not that he abandons it.

S. Why does he will what he ought not?

T. No cause precedes this will except that he can will.
S. And he wills because he can?

T. No. Because the good angel could will similarly yet does not. No one wills what he can will because he can, without some other cause, although if he is unable to will he never does.

S. Why then does he will?

T. Only because he wills. For this will has no other cause by which it is forced or attracted, but it was its own efficient cause, so to speak, as well as its own effect.

28. That the power to will what is unfitting was always good, and willing itself is good insofar as it exists

S. If the power to will and the willing itself are something real, they are good and come from God.

T. Both the one and the other are something real. And the power was only a good and spontaneous gift of God; the willing was good with respect to its being, but since it actuated unjustly it was an evil and in no way from God, from whom comes whatever is real. From God we have not only that which he gives us spontaneously but also that which we unjustly appropriate because God permits it. And insofar as God is said to do what he permits to come about, so he is said to give that which he permits to be stolen. Since therefore, God permitting, the bad angel abused the power God freely gave, he has from God the fact that he can use it, which is nothing other than his willing. For willing is nothing but using the power of willing, just as speaking is using the power of speech.